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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 




(DAVID DOUGLAS HOOPER) and SOUTH 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent commenced a condemnation action 
against appellant to acquire .25 acres of land which 
constituted a part of an irrigation facility owned and 
operated by appellant in Weber County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE 
The matter was tried before the Honorable 
Charles G. Cowley, sitting without .:i. jury, on the 
18th and 19th days of December, 1968. The trial court 
awarded appellant the amount of $450.00 as the value 
of the .25 acres actually taken. The trial court further 
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found that no compensable item of severance dam-
uge existed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully submits that the judg-
ment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant owns and operates an irrigation canal 
system in Weber County, Utah. In the specific area 
wherein the .25 acres of land was appropriated by 
respondent, the canal runs in an easterly-westerly 
direction and the highway improvement dissects the 
canal at right angles in a northerly-southerly direc-
tion. (Ex. A2) The highway facility is part of the inter-
state project and is identified as Project No. 1-15-8 
(7) 338. As it relates to appellant's property, a large 
overpass structure was constructed spanning both 
the canal of appellant and the Southern Pacific Rail-
road right-of-way which is located directly north and 
parallel to appellant's property. (Ex. A2) 
The trial court awarded appellant the amount 
of $450.00 for the land actually appropriated. This 
award was pursuant to a stipulation of the parties 
lhat the land value was $1,800.00 per acre. (T. 55) 
The take consisted of an area 332 feet in width 
and 36 feet in depth. A 12 foot maintenance road 
abutting the south boundary of the cdnal remained 
but for a length of 270 feet directly below the over-
pass structure. In this area, the maintenance road 
was reduced to a width of 4Vz feet. (Ex. A2) There 
is no dispute between the parties as to the existence 
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of this 4 V2 foot access to the banks of the canal im-
mediately below the structure. (T. 36) Appellant rec-
ognizes the availability of the remaining 4V2 foot 
access but complains that such access does not per-
mit the utilization of mechanized equipment in the 
area directly beneath the structure. 
The Willard Canal runs in a northerly-southerly 
direction parallel to appellant's canal and is located 
approximately 300 feet east of the interstate highway 
right-of-way line. Appellant's point of diversion is 
located on the Willard Canal. (Ex. 2) 
Appellant, in the statement of facts set forth in 
its brief, recites conclusive statements with respec 
to its inability to gain access to its maintenance road 
from the Willard Canal and also the method of con-
struction utilized by respondent. However, these 
statements are properly elements of argument and 
will be treated as such by respondent. 
It may be noted, however, that the trial court 
sp.:;cjficdly found that appellant has full access to 
the banks of its canal at every point and has 
sustained no severance damage to its remaining 
property. (R. 13, 14) 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO AWARD APPELLANT SEVERANCE DAMAGES. 
Appellant does not challenge the basic proposi-
tion that the judgment of a trial court will not be 
disturbed on appeal if there is evidence to support 
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such a judgment. Therefore, the only consideration 
presented to this court is whether the record sup-
ports a conclusion that severance damage does not 
exist. 
The evidence submitted by appellant to justify 
its claim of severance damage was u.ll related to the 
increased costs to be anticip:i.ted in the future main-
tenance of the canal system in the area of the high-
way facility. The question of access to the banks of 
the canal was not seriously questioned in tha.t ap-
pellant continues to enjoy full-length access even 
under the overpass structure. As noted above, ap-
pellant's complaint is predicated on the fact that 
mechanized equipment may not be operated under 
the structure and that a circuitous route must be 
pursued to allow mechanized equipment access to 
the canal area east o.l the s[ructure. 
The court specifically found that appellant en-
joys a perpetual eassment within the i:!.1terstate right-
of-way for the purpose of maintaining its canal. 
Therefore, appellant does net trespass on State 
owned property in performi.ng maintenance duties 
and has the physical ability to approach and main-
tain the canal. 
In State of Utah, by and through its Road Commission -v-
Stanger, 21 Utah 2d 185, 442 P.2d 941 (1968), this court 
stated at 21 Utah 2d 186: 
* * * that severance damages were those suf-
fered by a devaluation of the owner's property 
not taken, the causa causa causans of which 
was the actual taking of a part of a unit of 
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property, the whole of which he previously 
owned. 
To constitute severance damage as against non-
cornpensCJ.ble consequential damage, the loss must 
be the diminishment in valuG to the remaining prop-
erty by virtue 0£ the loss r:if that uppropriated and 
vvhich is the direct result of the appropriatlon. As 
st31.ed by this court in State of Utah, by and through its 
Road Commission -Ii- \Villiams, 22 Utah 2d 331, 452 P. 2d 
881 (1969) :i.t 22 Utah 2d 332, 333: 
All d".lr:iages not cc.used by the taking or the 
sevetin:-:- of the k~;.d nr ~he manner of the con-
struction of the im;)rovci-ent axe consequential 
and not within the protec~ion of the constitu-
tional p;:ovision (Article 1, 82ction 22, of the 
TJtd"! Cons•it,itio:i) unless they are such as 
wf'u!d be :;c~ion'.lb1e 3.t co:-:1mon law or would 
::iffe('.t the l.md physic"llly. :, ':' * 
The elements of that which appellant urges as 
severance damages are not .such a causally connect-
ed diminishment of market value. This was recogniz-
ed by this court in Stat(' P.oad Com minion -i·- Utah Sugar 
Company, 22 Utah 2d 77, 448 P. 2d 901 (1968). In a fac-
tual situation identical to that presented by the in-
stant case, this court concluded that additional costs 
required by extra mileage and wages of inspectors 
or canal riders incurred through the imposition of a 
circuitous route could not be considered severance 
damage. This court stated at 22 Utah 2d 79: 
Our own aCJthoritics clf'J.rly, or by analogy, 
subsUmtia~e the basic ru'.e set out in Nichols, 
I" 
I 
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supra, and th2 concept th:1t •o justify ''2ver·rnce 
d2.mages, the dama~e must be done to the land 
its21.r,--not to that on top of the land which is 
not a part of the realty, or what is done on top 
of the land, such as patrolling canals, as is the 
case here. 
Respondent submits that the above case is con-
trolling c.nd is dispositive of the instant case. 
Appellant a.ttempts to distinguish the Utah Sugar 
Company case on severnl grounds. First, a_ppsllant 
contends that the Utah Sugar Company case dealt 
with the improvement of an existing facility vvhile 
the instant case involves the esablishment of a new-
ly loco_ted facility. However, this argument ignores 
the basic fa.ct that the improvement and resultant 
control of access present jn the Utah Sugar Com-
~-:i3-n'r case produced exactly the same result with 
r2spect to can.3_1 maintenance problems as is found 
in the instant cas0. It was the result that such in-
l'rs:-ised m"J.intenance costs 'Nere not compensable. 
Th_:o;_; result should be eque>Jly applied Jn this mo.tter. 
Second, appellant sta~es at page 6 of its brief 
thot in the Utah Sugar Company case, the canal com-
pany had access to the banks of its canal at all 
points. However, this argument is incorrect for the 
reason that, in the Utah Sugar Company case, ac-
cess adjacent to the canal under the overpass struc-
ture was not present. This court recognized at 22 
Utah 2d 79: 
':' ':' * it had access not only by this method but 
:: 1so A.t the side of the freeway, on both sides 
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thereof and under the f rr:eway itself ,-the latter 
by boat, wadding, if the water were not too deep, 
or by other means. * * '; (Emphasis added) 
Appellant's attempts to factually distinguish the 
Utah Sugar Company case from the instant proceed-
ings fail bocause of a basic ministerpretat'on of the 
facts of the cited case and :ilso because of the exist-
ence of the 4 Y2 foot area under the structure present 
in the instant case. Respondent submits that a care-
ful consideration of the facts and legal doctrines set 
forth in the Utah Sugar Company case lead to the 
single conclusion that appellant's claim for sever-
ance damage on the basis therefore must fail 
Appellant submits further that the access to the 
area adjacent to the canal east of the freeway is im-
9aired because of the inability of appellant to bring 
motorized equipment off of the Willard Canal. The 
evidence with respect to this contention is somewhat 
confusing and not supported by the record as a 
whole. For example, Mr. Julian Powell, a director 
and secretary-treasurer of appellant, testified as fol-
lc_jws: 
Q You can still come off 12th North and cross 
the railroad tracks down to where the 
freeway is with the same full right you had 
before; can you not? 
A That's right. 
Q And the only problem with getting access 
to the banks of the canal east of the free-
way is this circuitous route which you 
must now travel; is this correct? 
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A. That's the only way we have of getting 
to the eastern part. 
Q But once you follow that route you do have 
access to the canal bank itself; do you not? 
A We do until we get to the freeway, yes. 
(T. 53) 
* * * 
Mr. Wilbur Cook, who testified as appellant's 
expert appraiser, also stated that a cul-de-sac area 
immediately adjacent to the structure on both the 
east and west side of the structure to permit the 
turning around of mechanized equipment would 
eliminate on element of severance damage. In lvfr. 
Cook's opinion, the only remaining severance dam-
age would be the increased maintenance cost by 
virtue of the circuity of travel. (T. 63) 
Because of this testimnoy by Mr. Cook, re-
spondent, through trial counsel, tendered to appel-
lant a reasonable area to allow the turning around 
of mechanized equipment on both the east and west 
side of the structure. This, of course, would eliminate 
the technical trespass occurring during the turning 
around operation. In accepting this tender, counsel 
for appellant stated: 
* * * 
"MR. RICHARDS: Yes. This canal bank is 
up some eight feet higher than the road, so if 
we'd either had some money to make that so 
it would be easy to go up and down there, or 
if the State did it, made a nice ramp down 
there, why then we could get in to everywhere 
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except under here. (indicating under structure) 
This would have to be manually cleaned, but 
then they could drive into there by driving 
around to do it." (T. 65) 
* * * 
Respondent recognizes that statements of coun-
sel are not to be considered as evidence. However, 
this acceptance of the cul-de-sac offer reflects the 
inconsistent position assumed by appellant after 
being encountered by the Utah Sugar Company 
case, supra, and lends support to the trial court's 
finding that full access of even motorlzed equip-
ment is available to appellant by merely pursuing 
the circuitous route. 
In further support of the trial court's findings, 
respondent directs this court's attention to the testi-
mony of Mr. Memory Cain, an expert fee appraiser 
who testified on behalf of respondent. Mr. Cain 
testified that his investigation revealed an ability on 
the part of appellant to transpor mechanized equip-
men down the Willard Canal to its maintenance 
road. Mr .Cain's investigation was further substan-
tiated by the existence of a 16 foot gate in the fence 
separating the properties of appellant and the 
W i 11 a rd Canal. This gate indicates a will-
ingness on the part of the Willard Canal owners to 
allow appellant access to its maintenance road of 
not only personnel but also equipment. (T. 161) 
Appellant devotes a good portion of its brief 
to criticism of the manner of construction of the over-
pass structure employed by respondent. However, 
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respondent submits that this appeal is not the proper 
procedural arena in which to contest 3uch an issue. 
An order of immediate occupancy was obtained 
by respondent on the 10th day of January, 1966. In 
the interim between the granting of the order and 
the trial, appellant failed to pursue any type of in-
junctive relief that may have been predicated on a 
claim of arbitrary and capricious action. 
A further inconsistency exists in appellant's 
value approach. A cost-of-cure figure was submitted 
on the basis of an adoption of one of two alterna-
tive proposals submitted by a witness for appellant. 
This evidence was submitted to allo·N the court to 
consider the damages sustamed by appellant by 
virtue of the manner of construction. However, the 
court properly recognized that the cost-of-cure ap-
proach was directed at a noncompensable element 
of damage and refused to adopt such an approach. 
The elimination of the circuitry of travel was not 
compensable and the cost-of-cure directed at 
eliminating such an element is also noncompens-
able. 
Respondent recognizes that under 78-34-i 0 (2) 
Utah Code Annotated (as amended 1969), certain 
damages resulting from the manner of construction 
proposed by a condemnor are to be allowed. How-
ever, in the instant case the damages resulting from 
the construction of the improvement are noncom-
pensable by their very nature. 
It is respectfully submitted that evidence of al-
ternative methods of construction is not evidence 
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of arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the 
respondent. By virtue of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah and the statutes pertaining thereto, respond-
ent stands ready and able to compensate a land 
owner for certain damages accruing by virtue of the 
construction. This is limited only by the considera-
tion that such damages must be compensable under 
the constitution and statutes relating thereto. In the 
instant case, it is obvious that such compensable 
damages do not exist. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the judgment of the 
trial court is amply supported by the record and 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GARY A. FRANK 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General 
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